The Relevance of Nietzsche

Who might have ears for Nietzsche?
Those who have their doubts not only about philosophy in the great Platonic tradition but also about liberal society with its empty abstractions and its blind passions. Although Nietzsche often locks horns with Christianity, for most of us his work "speaks" the loudest when it connects with the dissatisfaction we feel concerning a morality - a way of life - split between sporadic donations to charities prompted by media generated panics, professional advancement and the private alleviation of boredom. His most avid readers will be those who are aware of a lack of meaning - an institutional idiocy - in contemporary life, which implies a reluctance to assert the simplest and most common critique of society that some people - many people - are still not free enough and still not wealthy enough. These are people who are not happy with TV dinners (even as they eat them) or with holidays by the pool - people with a taste for something harder and more challenging but who are not satisfied merely with weekends spent rock climbing - people with the broadest of horizons who cannot help but look about themselves and find something missing.

What is wrong with philosophy?
1 Traditionally philosophers have looked for some self-evident truths - some non-empirical certainties - leading on from which they can erect a grand philosophical system. Faced with such a system, one of the things Nietzsche does is to point out the way in which those supposedly self-evident truths are actually rather dubious. A perfect example of this line of critique is his brilliant dissection of the Cartesian "I think" in Beyond Good and Evil (BGE16). Descartes believed that when a person has been prodded to suspend belief in all dubious received wisdom (in other words in everything that has hitherto passed for knowledge) he or she (or it, since it is conceivable that we are mistaken as to our gender) will find him- her- itself with nothing more than their own self-certainty. I may not be certain of anything external to me but I cannot doubt that I think, and in thinking it is self-evident that I am. The proposition "I think therefore I am" is then to serve as an unshakeable (because self-evident) bedrock on which to reconstruct the edifice of knowledge (craftily undermining the authority of the church in the process). Nietzsche correctly points out, without leaving the icy realm of philosophy, that even the simpler proposition "I think" is far from self-evident.

"When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, 'I think,' I find a whole series of daring assertions, the argumentative proof of which would be difficult, perhaps impossible: for instance, that it is 'I' who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an 'ego,' and finally, that it is already determined what is to be designated by thinking--that I KNOW what thinking is. For if I had not already decided within myself what it is, by what standard could I determine whether that which is just happening is not perhaps 'willing' or 'feeling'? In short, the assertion 'I think,' assumes that I COMPARE my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further 'knowledge,' it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me." BGE16

Nietzsche is pointing out that Descartes paid insufficient attention to the role that language might be playing. It could well be that the idea of an "I" - an ego - that subsequently thinks is simply a fiction conjured up by the grammar of our language which in German (as in English) dictates that a verb be preceded by a separate subject. It is far from self-evident that our language is not creating a false impression. Nietzsche is also correct to point out that "think" is a word which (like all other words) depends on comparisons to fix its meaning - comparisons which mediate knowledge and thereby give the lie to any apparent immediate certainty.

2 However, Nietzsche would never rest content with simply deflating the pretensions of certain philosophies. He is more interested in putting a philosophy back into its parochial context, seeing it as an expression of a particular way of life - a way of life which may well be questionable, objectionable. A philosopher like Kant, for instance, assumes that he has overcome his parochial limitations and is making claims that can be recognised as valid by any rational being (any rational being that understands German, that is). Nietzsche quite rightly sees these apparently innocent claims to absolute truth as expressions of a form of life. But this is not a matter simply of pointing out details in the biographies of people like Kant and Descartes - details external to features of their philosophies - details such as their social class or their being in the pockets of aristocratic patrons. Instead, it is a matter of seeing the psychological significance of the philosophy itself, which comes out in its implicit value judgments. The philosophical attempt, for instance, to transcend the parochial is not simply an innocent - if futile - attempt to tell the truth - the absolute truth. It is also an act of denigrating the parochial, of saying a resolute "No" to this contingent life.

Philosophers following in the footsteps of Plato denigrate we might call the real world (although for philosophy it is the merely apparent world) and elevate above it an ideal realm in which truth is unsullied by error and is far from the mire of contingency. For Nietzsche there is something very questionable (but also interesting and worthy of investigation) about a life - an utterly contigent life - that turns against itself and says "No" to its contingency.

Nietzsche frequently uses the term psychology to describe his line of investigation but little is said about the psychological background of individual philosophers. Much more rests on a speculative psychological interpretation of the most basic philosophical assumptions and attitudes. The question is really: What sort of mentality is being expressed in this philosophy? And Nietzsche sees no need (has no need) to have the philosopher lie on his couch and begin a lengthy psychoanalysis.

What sets this psychology apart from the scientific psychology that we have become familiar with is that it is laced with criticisms of the way that philosophy and Christianty, among other things, elaborate and consolidate degenerate forms of life.

What grounds does Nietzsche have for being so critical?

Nietzsche is scathing - and this is another feature that sets his work apart from academic philosophy. In deploring the No-saying of philosophy, Christianity and much else besides, Nietzsche is simply taking a stand and expressing a point of view - one which we may or may not share. Although the philosophical tendency is to insist that there must be some universal ground or universally valid technique for making such an evaluation, Nietzsche sees that what we actually have is a conflict between different attitudes - between different ways of life - between which there can be no impartial adjudication, as if a neutral referee could descend from the heaven of Ideas. Nietzsche has his perspective - not an idiosyncratic, an all-too-personal one, but one he represents. His attitude could well be our attitude if the forces that run through him also run through us. We will agree with him if we share his concern with the decay of our culture and the way forces are at work which make life less meaningful.

The perspective is clear from - amongst other things - section 43 of The Antichrist. Although this passage concerns Christianity, all other critiques are launched from the same viewpoint.

When the centre of gravity of life is placed, not in life itself, but in "the beyond"--in nothingness--then one has taken away its centre of gravity altogether. The vast lie of personal immortality destroys all reason, all natural instinct--henceforth, everything in the instincts that is beneficial, that fosters life and that safeguards the future is a cause of suspicion. So to live that life no longer has any meaning: this is now the "meaning" of life.... Why be public-spirited? Why take any pride in descent and forefathers? Why labour together, trust one another, or concern one's self about the common welfare, and try to serve it?... Merely so many "temptations," so many strayings from the "straight path."--"One thing only is necessary".... That every man, because he has an "immortal soul," is as good as every other man; that in an infinite universe of things the "salvation" of every individual may lay claim to eternal importance.

From a similar perspective we might be concerned with a whole range of things in our world from the cult of the casual and the personal flacidity that it implies, to the way our society has allowed the impersonal forces of international finance, for instance, to place quite unnecessarily narrow limits on public policy so that we must all follow the invisible hand.

Although Nietzsche's perspective is often associated with the worst kind of German nationalism, he is more inclined to speak out of a concern for the fate of European culture - a concern we might share if it matters to us that Europe has become little more than a protection zone for the most narrow-minded economic interests, dismissing the need to create a grander, more meaningful European identity that might make people want to be truly European, proud to be European, willing to make sacrifices for Europe to fight for it even (if such a thing is still even thinkable).

One such reference to Europe as the locus of concern appears in section 62 of Beyond Good and Evil, which begins with his impression of his European contemporaries.

Men, not great enough, nor hard enough, to be entitled as artists to take part in fashioning MAN; men, not sufficiently strong and far-sighted to ALLOW, with sublime self-constraint, the obvious law of the thousandfold failures and perishings to prevail; men, not sufficiently noble to see the radically different grades of rank and intervals of rank that separate man from man:--SUCH men, with their "equality before God," have hitherto swayed the destiny of Europe; until at last a dwarfed, almost ludicrous species has been produced, a gregarious animal, something obliging, sickly, mediocre, the European of the present day.

But are Nietzsche's ideas not really a theoretical pelude to fascism?
By very selectively picking and choosing, Nietzsche can be made to seem like a proto-fascist, but there is a much more generous and a somewhat more intelligent reading which would negate any such conlusion. There is in his writings what might be called a moral realism which is a welcome antidote both to a modern moral idealism and to the mindless combative nationalism that has been breaking out over the past years.

There is a tendency to assume that an intelligent approach to moral and political issues must necessarily aim at the universal - dreaming perhaps with John Lenon of a future utopia of global peace, equality and harmony. There is also a common assumption that such things as power and social division ought to be overcome. The marxist dream, for instance, was of a society in which classes would disappear, individual states would disappear, society would become truly global and the power of governments would no longer be a contentious issue since there would be nothing left to do but administer an abundant supply of things.

'Life itself necessarily involves assimilation, injury, violation of the foreign and the weaker, suppression, hardness, the forcing of one's own forms upon something else, ingestion, and - at least in its mildest form - exploitation. But why should we always use such words which were coined from time immemorial to reveal a calumniatory intention?..... "Exploitation".....belongs to the nature of living things, it is a basic organic function, a consequence of the will to power which is the will to life. Admittedly this is a novelty as a theory - as a reality it is the basic fact underlying all history. Let us be honest with ourselves at least this far!'

Such opposition is vital not only to the life of the individual but also to society. In section 209 of the same book Nietzsche expresses a wish that Russia become more of a threat to Europe so that the latter might be prompted to become more unified, putting an end to "the long spun-out comedy of its petty-statism, and its dynastic as well as its democratic many-willed-ness." It is easy for refined intellects to wish for an end to international conflict, but is Nietzsche not right that societies thrive - they rise up and hone themselves - in situations of conflict? And is Nietzsche not right that for our own self-respect - for our own enthusiasm for this life - we need to be a part of a social movement that is achieving something - a process of achievement that implies an opposition, an antagonism? Aren't opposition and antagonism therefore an essential part of life, however repugnant that might sound to the idealists who dream of a future in which, by the way, there wouldn't really be anything to do besides reclining in the sun and becoming flabby while recalling the glories of past struggles (of past wars?).

If all truth is relative - if it is always a matter of competing perspectives - then surely there is no truth?
In section 108 of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche says "There is no such thing as moral phenomena, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena." But does this mean that the interpretation just expresses a "purely subjective" preference that can raise no real claim to truth?

Nietzsche does not waste much time worrying about the subjectivity or objectivity - truth or untruth - of what he is saying. His approach implies a realistic acceptance of his historical situation - of the fact that what he has to deal with is not something that could ever be "purely objective". He is in a situation that concerns him and that he is responding to and from which there is no getting away from. He is also writing to others in that situation, not to a generalised audience of imaginary rational beings, all of whom must be imagined to agree with the claims he makes before they can be accepted as true. His task is not to come up with an indubitable system but to persuade his readers, using all the means at his disposal (including irony and humour) to see their situation in one way rather than another - to see it not as a slow progress towards an ideal world free of animosity and exploitation, but as a time of cultural decay. The perspective - the engagement and concern - is a condition for the possibility of recognising the truth of the interpretation. There is simply no other way of making a judgment. Of course, there will be a clash of interpretations and it will often become apparent that there is no point arguing with people whose instincts and feelings point in a completely different direction. Nietzche knows he is speaking to a particular group of people - the "free spirits " - (who hopefully will not just consent to the truth of what he says but help change things). He explicitly says that one should accept that one's audience is limited. As he puts it: "One must renounce the bad taste of wishing to agree with many people."(BGE 43)

Does Nietzsche not have a metaphysics?
Heidegger, for instance, writes at great length about a metaphysics that Nietzsche sometimes seems to have - one in which all being is becoming. The idea of the eternal recurrence can also be read as a statement of the essential nature of reality - a metaphysical statement going beyond any scientific claim about some particular set of natural phenomena. But Nietzsche would never have attempted to write a work of metahysics (trying to outdo Hegel, perhaps), but from his perspective he knows that he needs to spin out the categories in terms of which some sense can be made of the world. A philosophy of some sort is necessary. What matters is the spirit with which it is developed and the way it is understood. Nietzsche's approach is surely the same as the approach that Theodore Adorno later took in relation to the philosophy of history, when he said that the philosophy of history must be both construed and denied. We need a philosophy (of history in this case) but there is no point assuming that it is the absolute truth about the thing-in-itself.